Finland, the North, and us
When the Finnish presidential election a good year before was impending, there were many signs that Finland's people wanted peace. The voices which were heard when the land in 1941 made joint their case with Germany were now silent. No one spoke any longer of the original war aims: incorporation of Greater Carelia and the total defeat of the Soviet Union, which had been proclaimed by such prominent personalities as Mannerheim, Tanner, and the speaker of the parliament, Haukkeli. Now in 1943, is it especially coming from the Social Democrat's viewpoint, that Finland's war has been pursued independently of Hitler's, and therefore as such could conclude a separate peace. And they officially maintained that the fight only intended to secure Finland's borders and independence.
After Ryti was re-elected and Lincomies had taken over the government, still the war continued, and first after the last year's great Russian victories did the Finnish government decide to seek a clarification as to the Russian peace requirements. When these were known to the world, even the most upstanding friend of Finland had to admit that a basis was created for a more dignified peace, than one could have dared hope. Compared with the Allies' demands to Italy, the Soviet requirements were especially favourable: there was no talk of unconditional surrender, nor of participation in the war against Finland's former ally. Nor even of establishing Russia support bases inside of the county's borders. And furthermore one understood that the Russians were willing to give up their demand for Petsamo and for Finnish disarmament of General Dietl's troops.
By this the outsider is obliged to consider that peace was both possible and that it offered sufficient guarantees to preserve the integrity and independence of Finland.
It was therefore with surprise, disappointment and concern, when one learned in the ranks fighting for democracy, that the Finnish government had refused the Soviet offer. Surprise, because their reply seemed out of touch with the real political situation; disappointment at Finland's not utilising the opportunity to distance itself from armed brotherhood with Nazi Germany; and concern, because one could see that a continuation of the war under no circumstances could secure better terms.
A strong censorship inhibits the outside world from getting an insight as to how great a degree the Finnish people stood behind the resulting decision. But it must however raise doubts as to a united opinion, when the » Swedish press « strongly asserts that full reason for the war's continuation rests upon the governments shoulders. The conclusion one reaches therefore, is that the refusal of the peace offer was made under pressure from the German ally and from influential circles within Finland, which nourished German sympathies and which set themselves against any attempts to attain an understanding with the great eastern neighbour.
It is often enough been pointed out that the plans for an extended Nordic co-operation after the war rest upon a weak foundation. The widely varied conditions under which, the five nations have lived through this year, have created greater practical and ideological dividing lines than known before. The Swedish politic of neutrality, and the special troop transit, has caused a Norwegian dislike of Sweden, which will take years to overcome. And both the Norwegian resistance and exile government in London have unequivocally declared that their country's foreign politic in the future will be carried out in direct affiliation with the Allies. That also Iceland will position itself by this standpoint, one cannot doubt, and as far as our feelings are concerned we are convinced that the same will and should occur with Denmark. We have during this war we had the same experience as Norway, and it is through this created a natural basis for a joint policy in the year of peace.
But this means that the road to a closer Nordic co-operation must be pursued via the international peace organisation, which will be created with the U.S.A., Great Britain, and Soviet Union as pillars. Surely the closer Finland ties itself to Germany's case, surely the longer it finds itself at war with Russia and England, and the more difficult it will be to find a place for itself in the democratic world community and thereby in a common Nordic politic, which also includes the countries now fighting Nazism.
As we said, Finland must decide its own fate, and despite the difficulties, which the refusal of the peace offer may put in the way of creating closer Nordic co-operation in peacetime, there would have been understanding for the Finnish position in Denmark, had the peace terms been threatening to the country's freedom and integrity. But we cannot see that this was the case. On the contrary, it seems to us that the Russian requirements have knocked the legs from under the Nazi propaganda, which sought to frighten Europe's people with an alleged Russian imperialism.
A New Chapter in Danish Foreign Political History
The dangers which for centuries have threatened Denmark have centred in the Baltic. And it was Germany, among the Baltic nations, which has repeatedly infringed upon our territory and our independence - in contrast never Russia, which on more than one occasion has entered into the struggle for us. When we now again shall draw up a course in foreign policy, it is the Baltic, which immediately draws our attention. The North Sea of course remains of crucial importance for us, but it is not upon its coasts where the fundamental change has been set.
The position taken is already in fact outlined. We are clear that the Soviet Union's entry and contribution in the war effort was a necessary requirement for our country's liberation and continued independence. Generally speaking, there is a strong desire for a closer knowledge about the structure and motivative forces within the Soviet community, and a common respect and admiration for the initial Russian achievements. Denmark has, through the sending of Th. Døssing as diplomatic envoy, sought to give an impression of this position.
But there is a need for a more precise discussion of the conditions under which Danish foreign policy will operate in the future, and some of these conditions can already be foreseen.
1) The information available from the lands occupied by the Soviet troops, points towards that the Soviet Union does not intend to interfere in other countries' internal affairs. All the three great powers have through the Crimea declaration again underlined their desire secure the peoples' full rights to conduct their own affairs. When individual circles are expressing dislike to the Soviet Union this is due for a part to a lack of knowledge of the Soviet position, and it is therefore an important task to see that information is provided equally so carefully about Russia, as about other countries.
This all around enlightenment is the responsibility of schools, the press, radio, and publishers to attend to. But it is in very specialised fields in science, technology, and economy, where the Soviet Union can render us service (for which we hopefully will repay). In the moment is the Russian's war-art and weapons technique conspicuous, and the Danish military authorities will surely in the future, when Denmark inside of international frameworks shall have an effective army, derive new inspiration therefrom. The same may be reciprocated by a long series of civil areas. The Danish legation in Moscow ought to be in the future one of our most important representatives, where Danish agriculture, industry, trade and culture can nurse their interests.
2) The Soviet Union is the only great power by the Baltic. Germany's brutal power striving has once and for all been crushed. Even after the First World War our foreign policy was influenced by a fear of Germany, but this weakness from the Danish side is now over. In so far as the plans of Churchill, Stalin and Roosevelt for a new peaceful world are successful - and with the peoples' warm support there is eventually a chance for such a world - is the fear eliminated from foreign policy. This is a basic principle of the Crimea declaration, where among others it is written that: » By this declaration we reiterate… our determination in co-operation with other peace loving nations to create a world order based on justice, dedicated to peace, security, freedom and mankind's general welfare. « In the Baltic area the Soviet Union is now the power that can thwart any attack on peaceful coexistence, and Denmark must through its co-operation in the international peace organisation give support hereby.
3) The Soviet Union is a land rapidly progressing, with full employment of all work forces and the ability to co-ordinate new production and attend to new needs in a systematical development. Possible Russian post-war crisis will not be due to conditions economical or foreign. The country, which enters into trade with the Soviet Union, can therefore count on a reliable market. The Soviet Union possesses superior Baltic Sea harbours and is resolved to utilise intercourse with other nations to expand its production apparatus and the consumption capabilities of its citizens. Denmark must from the beginning strive to acquire a share in the Soviet lands’ foreign trade. » Riga-Boats « should readily become a common word in the Danish language. It is not however to early to consider about wdiv style="text-align: justify;">hich wares the Soviet Union can think to buy here, but Th. Døssing has already pointed out in an interview the quality agriculture prdiv style="text-align: justify;">oducts, cattle breeding, and ship building.
When the Finnish presidential election a good year before was impending, there were many signs that Finland's people wanted peace. The voices which were heard when the land in 1941 made joint their case with Germany were now silent. No one spoke any longer of the original war aims: incorporation of Greater Carelia and the total defeat of the Soviet Union, which had been proclaimed by such prominent personalities as Mannerheim, Tanner, and the speaker of the parliament, Haukkeli. Now in 1943, is it especially coming from the Social Democrat's viewpoint, that Finland's war has been pursued independently of Hitler's, and therefore as such could conclude a separate peace. And they officially maintained that the fight only intended to secure Finland's borders and independence.
After Ryti was re-elected and Lincomies had taken over the government, still the war continued, and first after the last year's great Russian victories did the Finnish government decide to seek a clarification as to the Russian peace requirements. When these were known to the world, even the most upstanding friend of Finland had to admit that a basis was created for a more dignified peace, than one could have dared hope. Compared with the Allies' demands to Italy, the Soviet requirements were especially favourable: there was no talk of unconditional surrender, nor of participation in the war against Finland's former ally. Nor even of establishing Russia support bases inside of the county's borders. And furthermore one understood that the Russians were willing to give up their demand for Petsamo and for Finnish disarmament of General Dietl's troops.
By this the outsider is obliged to consider that peace was both possible and that it offered sufficient guarantees to preserve the integrity and independence of Finland.
It was therefore with surprise, disappointment and concern, when one learned in the ranks fighting for democracy, that the Finnish government had refused the Soviet offer. Surprise, because their reply seemed out of touch with the real political situation; disappointment at Finland's not utilising the opportunity to distance itself from armed brotherhood with Nazi Germany; and concern, because one could see that a continuation of the war under no circumstances could secure better terms.
A strong censorship inhibits the outside world from getting an insight as to how great a degree the Finnish people stood behind the resulting decision. But it must however raise doubts as to a united opinion, when the » Swedish press « strongly asserts that full reason for the war's continuation rests upon the governments shoulders. The conclusion one reaches therefore, is that the refusal of the peace offer was made under pressure from the German ally and from influential circles within Finland, which nourished German sympathies and which set themselves against any attempts to attain an understanding with the great eastern neighbour.
It is often enough been pointed out that the plans for an extended Nordic co-operation after the war rest upon a weak foundation. The widely varied conditions under which, the five nations have lived through this year, have created greater practical and ideological dividing lines than known before. The Swedish politic of neutrality, and the special troop transit, has caused a Norwegian dislike of Sweden, which will take years to overcome. And both the Norwegian resistance and exile government in London have unequivocally declared that their country's foreign politic in the future will be carried out in direct affiliation with the Allies. That also Iceland will position itself by this standpoint, one cannot doubt, and as far as our feelings are concerned we are convinced that the same will and should occur with Denmark. We have during this war we had the same experience as Norway, and it is through this created a natural basis for a joint policy in the year of peace.
But this means that the road to a closer Nordic co-operation must be pursued via the international peace organisation, which will be created with the U.S.A., Great Britain, and Soviet Union as pillars. Surely the closer Finland ties itself to Germany's case, surely the longer it finds itself at war with Russia and England, and the more difficult it will be to find a place for itself in the democratic world community and thereby in a common Nordic politic, which also includes the countries now fighting Nazism.
As we said, Finland must decide its own fate, and despite the difficulties, which the refusal of the peace offer may put in the way of creating closer Nordic co-operation in peacetime, there would have been understanding for the Finnish position in Denmark, had the peace terms been threatening to the country's freedom and integrity. But we cannot see that this was the case. On the contrary, it seems to us that the Russian requirements have knocked the legs from under the Nazi propaganda, which sought to frighten Europe's people with an alleged Russian imperialism.
A New Chapter in Danish Foreign Political History
The dangers which for centuries have threatened Denmark have centred in the Baltic. And it was Germany, among the Baltic nations, which has repeatedly infringed upon our territory and our independence - in contrast never Russia, which on more than one occasion has entered into the struggle for us. When we now again shall draw up a course in foreign policy, it is the Baltic, which immediately draws our attention. The North Sea of course remains of crucial importance for us, but it is not upon its coasts where the fundamental change has been set.
The position taken is already in fact outlined. We are clear that the Soviet Union's entry and contribution in the war effort was a necessary requirement for our country's liberation and continued independence. Generally speaking, there is a strong desire for a closer knowledge about the structure and motivative forces within the Soviet community, and a common respect and admiration for the initial Russian achievements. Denmark has, through the sending of Th. Døssing as diplomatic envoy, sought to give an impression of this position.
But there is a need for a more precise discussion of the conditions under which Danish foreign policy will operate in the future, and some of these conditions can already be foreseen.
1) The information available from the lands occupied by the Soviet troops, points towards that the Soviet Union does not intend to interfere in other countries' internal affairs. All the three great powers have through the Crimea declaration again underlined their desire secure the peoples' full rights to conduct their own affairs. When individual circles are expressing dislike to the Soviet Union this is due for a part to a lack of knowledge of the Soviet position, and it is therefore an important task to see that information is provided equally so carefully about Russia, as about other countries.
This all around enlightenment is the responsibility of schools, the press, radio, and publishers to attend to. But it is in very specialised fields in science, technology, and economy, where the Soviet Union can render us service (for which we hopefully will repay). In the moment is the Russian's war-art and weapons technique conspicuous, and the Danish military authorities will surely in the future, when Denmark inside of international frameworks shall have an effective army, derive new inspiration therefrom. The same may be reciprocated by a long series of civil areas. The Danish legation in Moscow ought to be in the future one of our most important representatives, where Danish agriculture, industry, trade and culture can nurse their interests.
2) The Soviet Union is the only great power by the Baltic. Germany's brutal power striving has once and for all been crushed. Even after the First World War our foreign policy was influenced by a fear of Germany, but this weakness from the Danish side is now over. In so far as the plans of Churchill, Stalin and Roosevelt for a new peaceful world are successful - and with the peoples' warm support there is eventually a chance for such a world - is the fear eliminated from foreign policy. This is a basic principle of the Crimea declaration, where among others it is written that: » By this declaration we reiterate… our determination in co-operation with other peace loving nations to create a world order based on justice, dedicated to peace, security, freedom and mankind's general welfare. « In the Baltic area the Soviet Union is now the power that can thwart any attack on peaceful coexistence, and Denmark must through its co-operation in the international peace organisation give support hereby.
3) The Soviet Union is a land rapidly progressing, with full employment of all work forces and the ability to co-ordinate new production and attend to new needs in a systematical development. Possible Russian post-war crisis will not be due to conditions economical or foreign. The country, which enters into trade with the Soviet Union, can therefore count on a reliable market. The Soviet Union possesses superior Baltic Sea harbours and is resolved to utilise intercourse with other nations to expand its production apparatus and the consumption capabilities of its citizens. Denmark must from the beginning strive to acquire a share in the Soviet lands’ foreign trade. » Riga-Boats « should readily become a common word in the Danish language. It is not however to early to consider about wdiv style="text-align: justify;">hich wares the Soviet Union can think to buy here, but Th. Døssing has already pointed out in an interview the quality agriculture prdiv style="text-align: justify;">oducts, cattle breeding, and ship building.
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The freedom movement has brought Denmark much goodwill in the Soviet Union as from among others members of the united [Allied] nations. If we are able to maintain this goodwill in our foreign policy, this can mark the beginning of a whole new era for us, where Denmark's history is not determined from outside pressure, but represent a peaceful and profitable co-operation with others, including the Soviet Union.