The following was received in July of 2008.
Dear Mr Lindblad
Thank you for your email of 9th July. I have been asked to reply on Sir Nigel’s behalf.
The decision to take action in Iraq was driven by Saddam Hussein’s refusal to co-operate with the UN-sponsored weapons inspections. This, together with a large body of evidence, including the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission’s own assessments, ultimately led to the decision that it was simply too dangerous to let the situation in Iraq develop further. The UK Government firmly believes that the right judgement was made in removing the threat that Saddam Hussein posed. In the longer term, Iraq , the region and wider world will be a better and safer place without Saddam Hussein and his regime. The UK Government would have not engaged in 2003 military action if not satisfied that such action was justified or lawful.
UK and US Armed Forces have done and continue to do an outstanding job in Iraq. We condemn all acts of abuse and have always treated any allegations of wrongdoing brought to our attention extremely seriously. It remains Ministry Of Defence policy to initiate a Service Police investigation where there are any grounds to suspect that a criminal act has or might have been committed by service personnel, and/or where the rules of engagement have been breached. There is no evidence to suggest that the US used tactical nuclear bombs during any battle during operations in Iraq . The allegation you refer to of 9 April 2007 was made by Saifeddin Fulayh Hassan Taha al-Rawi, former commander of Iraq 's Republican Guard. Al-Rawi was a close associate of Saddam Hussein, and is wanted by the Iraqi people to face justice for his activities under the former regime.
While I cannot comment on when US forces will leave Iraq we have always said that UK forces will remain in Iraq as long as they are needed and the democratic Iraqi Government request their presence. The key task now for the British forces based in and around Basrah Airport is to help the Iraqi 14th Division. The UK’s mentoring task for 14th Division is a finite one. Once the Division has achieved full operational capability, the UK will examine with our Iraqi and Coalition partners what role and resources will then be needed from our military forces, driven, as ever, by the conditions on the ground rather than an artificial timetable. It is too early to say precisely what that role might be, and precisely what it might demand. For example, it is likely that the Iraqis will wish for continued support at sea and in the air, and some other specialist niche capabilities, beyond the point at which a significant land presence is required. But our clear aim and expectation, as Iraqi capabilities mature, is to be able to establish an enduring UK-Iraqi security relationship based on assistance more at the strategic than the operational/tactical level.
I hope this explains the situation.
Yours sincerely,
Mark Newton
Thank you for your email of 9th July. I have been asked to reply on Sir Nigel’s behalf.
The decision to take action in Iraq was driven by Saddam Hussein’s refusal to co-operate with the UN-sponsored weapons inspections. This, together with a large body of evidence, including the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission’s own assessments, ultimately led to the decision that it was simply too dangerous to let the situation in Iraq develop further. The UK Government firmly believes that the right judgement was made in removing the threat that Saddam Hussein posed. In the longer term, Iraq , the region and wider world will be a better and safer place without Saddam Hussein and his regime. The UK Government would have not engaged in 2003 military action if not satisfied that such action was justified or lawful.
UK and US Armed Forces have done and continue to do an outstanding job in Iraq. We condemn all acts of abuse and have always treated any allegations of wrongdoing brought to our attention extremely seriously. It remains Ministry Of Defence policy to initiate a Service Police investigation where there are any grounds to suspect that a criminal act has or might have been committed by service personnel, and/or where the rules of engagement have been breached. There is no evidence to suggest that the US used tactical nuclear bombs during any battle during operations in Iraq . The allegation you refer to of 9 April 2007 was made by Saifeddin Fulayh Hassan Taha al-Rawi, former commander of Iraq 's Republican Guard. Al-Rawi was a close associate of Saddam Hussein, and is wanted by the Iraqi people to face justice for his activities under the former regime.
While I cannot comment on when US forces will leave Iraq we have always said that UK forces will remain in Iraq as long as they are needed and the democratic Iraqi Government request their presence. The key task now for the British forces based in and around Basrah Airport is to help the Iraqi 14th Division. The UK’s mentoring task for 14th Division is a finite one. Once the Division has achieved full operational capability, the UK will examine with our Iraqi and Coalition partners what role and resources will then be needed from our military forces, driven, as ever, by the conditions on the ground rather than an artificial timetable. It is too early to say precisely what that role might be, and precisely what it might demand. For example, it is likely that the Iraqis will wish for continued support at sea and in the air, and some other specialist niche capabilities, beyond the point at which a significant land presence is required. But our clear aim and expectation, as Iraqi capabilities mature, is to be able to establish an enduring UK-Iraqi security relationship based on assistance more at the strategic than the operational/tactical level.
I hope this explains the situation.
Yours sincerely,
Mark Newton