26 October 1946
TO: AB-43, Runich
FROM: AB-51, Amzon
SUBJECT: Stefan BANDERA
REF: R-6064; LTS 746
1) As you know, the purpose of Colonel ANTONIUK's recent visit to USFET was to aid the U.S. authorities in the detection of BANDERA's whereabouts. Source Josephine reports that ANTONIUK is now devoting all his energies to the accomplishment of this one aim and, needless to emphasize, BANDERA's delivery into the Soviet hands would be the crowning success in ANTONIUK's career as an intelligence officer. We should, therefore, not underrate the determination of the Soviets to bring this to pass. The attached report was passed by ANTONIUK to G-2, USFET. It is of considerable interest inasmuch as it lists one STETSKO, Yaroslav, (also spelled STECHKO, STECZKO and STECZO) who is about to be arrested in Munich and brought to MISC, Oberursel, for interrogation. The following comment upon likely implications of STETSKO's arrest, offered by our USFET representative, can be accepted as inspired by official USFET sources.
2) "If STETSKO reveals BANDERA's hideouts, G-2 officially will probably try to pick him up and deliver him to the Soviets. I think, however, that they would wink at BANDERA's being tipped off. Some people here are worried about the possibility that STETSKO may be a soviet penetration agent who will report to the RIS all information given to MISC, so they are bound to go ahead on whatever information he gives. If BANDERA is found the Political Adviser, Mr. Muccio would undoubtedly concur in his delivery to the Soviets."
3) In view of the serious compromise which no doubt would result to American interests in any form of collaboration with UHVR, should BANDERA be turned over to the Soviets by the U.S. authorities and, on the other hand, considering the equally serious effects on Soviet-American relations likely to ensue from open U.S. connivance in the unhampered continuance of his anti-Soviet activities on German soil, we should take special pains at steering a judicious
TO: AB-43, Runich
FROM: AB-51, Amzon
SUBJECT: Stefan BANDERA
REF: R-6064; LTS 746
1) As you know, the purpose of Colonel ANTONIUK's recent visit to USFET was to aid the U.S. authorities in the detection of BANDERA's whereabouts. Source Josephine reports that ANTONIUK is now devoting all his energies to the accomplishment of this one aim and, needless to emphasize, BANDERA's delivery into the Soviet hands would be the crowning success in ANTONIUK's career as an intelligence officer. We should, therefore, not underrate the determination of the Soviets to bring this to pass. The attached report was passed by ANTONIUK to G-2, USFET. It is of considerable interest inasmuch as it lists one STETSKO, Yaroslav, (also spelled STECHKO, STECZKO and STECZO) who is about to be arrested in Munich and brought to MISC, Oberursel, for interrogation. The following comment upon likely implications of STETSKO's arrest, offered by our USFET representative, can be accepted as inspired by official USFET sources.
2) "If STETSKO reveals BANDERA's hideouts, G-2 officially will probably try to pick him up and deliver him to the Soviets. I think, however, that they would wink at BANDERA's being tipped off. Some people here are worried about the possibility that STETSKO may be a soviet penetration agent who will report to the RIS all information given to MISC, so they are bound to go ahead on whatever information he gives. If BANDERA is found the Political Adviser, Mr. Muccio would undoubtedly concur in his delivery to the Soviets."
3) In view of the serious compromise which no doubt would result to American interests in any form of collaboration with UHVR, should BANDERA be turned over to the Soviets by the U.S. authorities and, on the other hand, considering the equally serious effects on Soviet-American relations likely to ensue from open U.S. connivance in the unhampered continuance of his anti-Soviet activities on German soil, we should take special pains at steering a judicious
DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2004 2006
/2/
middle-course. The following course suggests itself as best suited to avoid either pitfall.
4) You should contact the Lynx group and, referring back to your last meeting when you made an abortive attempt at drawing them out regarding BANDERA's present whereabouts, point out that the secrecy surrounding his movements would in the long view create more harm than good. You would point out that rather than asking a direct question and courting another rebuff, you preferred to place yourself squarely on record as greatly concerned as regards BANDERA's security but equally unable to materially contribute to its preservation, because you had not been taken into the complete confidence of the UHVR. You did not share the view that irreparable damage would be caused by BANDERA's extradition, although it would doubtlessly constitute a heavy blow to the prestige for the Ukrainian movement. Your main concern was, however, to establish a perfect understanding with the UHVR that BANDERA, once captured, would inevitably be handed over to the Soviets by the U.S. authorities. It would then be too late to intervene andplanning protests would be absolutely to no avail. The UHVR would only have to blame itself in that case. Any demands made on you for a specific undertaking to guarantee BANDERA's security, vis a vis the U.S. authorities, should be declined, even if UHVR sees fit to let you in on the secret of his whereabouts.
5) In case STETSKO should come forward with information containing a lead to BANDERA's hiding place, we shall try to inform you on time. If we have reason to believe that coverage of that lead is likely to result in BANDERA's capture, we shall have to lay out our course of action in the light of our conflicting interests in the matter. Tipping off BANDERA, if this should be decided upon, would have to be done with utmost discretion obviating the remotest possibility that his escape is traced back to a U.S. agency. In anticipation of such contingency, you should now cast about for secure means of passing such information, taking into account, of course, that should any intimation of our connivance in BANDERA's escape reach the ears of the UHVR, we could expect with certainty that the Soviets would learn about it sooner or later. This dilemma could best be avoided, we believe, if the tip-off be launched into UHVR channels through an elaborate chain of notional and/or actual cutouts.
Distribution: 1 - AB-43, Munich (Attach) 1 - USFET Det.
1 - SC, Washington (Attach) 1 - Registry
1 - SC, [ ] 1 - Ops
1 - SC, [ ]
TOP SECRET CONTROL
20 November 1946
TO: SC Washington
FROM: SC Amzon
SUBJEXT: Search for BANDERA, Leader of the OUN
REF: LTX-767, Wash 4345
1) The risk of compromise in attempting to help BANDERA either directly or indirectly has been kept down to the absolute minimum. G-2 USFET is definitely loath to comply with the Soviet request to find BANDERA and to repatriate him as a "war criminal". This, we have been given to understand unofficially of course, and we can be reasonably sure that a warning passed to a UHVR representative will not be considered as an act of bad faith on our part if, by a remote chance, G-2 USFET should learn about it.
2) As far as compromising ourselves vis a vis the Soviets is concerned, we have taken pains not to let this warning appear in the light of an official "tip-off", but rather in the nature of a general observation. Once BANDERA has been apprehended we would decline to be in any way connected with the case, a point we stressed in LTS 767. In this connection we should like to mention as an interesting side-light that Lt Col Dasher recently expressed to AB 52 his disappointment that G-2 USFET has failed to honor its pledge to Colonel ANTONIUK to make every conceivable effort to locate BANDERA.
3) Your question whether there are compelling reasons for us to help BANDERA directly or indirectly, can be answered in the affirmative if you accept the premise that we are definitely interested in cautiously cultivating our contacts with the UHVR if not along lines of active cooperation, then with at least the objective to keep ourselves informed on what its plans are and to what extent it has succeeded in building up and servicing cells in the Ukraine. We asked KILKENNY how our relationship with the UHVR, at present and in the future, would be affected if the Americans were to lend a hand in the capture and repatriation of BANDERA to the Soviets. He said he could answer this question in one word: FINITO. In order to enable you to appraise the importance of BANDERA in the hierarchy of Ukrainian Underground leaders - and we are thinking here of the Ukrainian movement as a whole
TOP SECRET
DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2004 2006
TOP SECRET CONTROL
irrespective of its many factions who differ in methods rather than in the main objective - we have requested KILKENNY to prepare a study which you will find attached herewith.
4) In attempting to visualize the effects of the loss of BANDERA through American connivance, there is one more consideration which should be brought to your attention. The UHVR is avowedly a terrorist organization, determined to accomplish its objectives by terroristic means. (That appears to be one of the main reasons for the pre-occupation of the Soviet-Intelligence with Ukrainian rather than other dissident groups like e.g., the Caucasians.) It should therefore not be ruled out that the UHVR would want to retaliate by terroristic means and that its suspicions would fasten on the American representatives with whom they have been exclusively dealing.
Distribution:
2 - Wash
1 - AB 45
1 - [ ]
1 - [ ]
1 - AB 39
1 - Aust
1 - [ ]
1 - Ops
1 - Registry
TOP SECRET
4) You should contact the Lynx group and, referring back to your last meeting when you made an abortive attempt at drawing them out regarding BANDERA's present whereabouts, point out that the secrecy surrounding his movements would in the long view create more harm than good. You would point out that rather than asking a direct question and courting another rebuff, you preferred to place yourself squarely on record as greatly concerned as regards BANDERA's security but equally unable to materially contribute to its preservation, because you had not been taken into the complete confidence of the UHVR. You did not share the view that irreparable damage would be caused by BANDERA's extradition, although it would doubtlessly constitute a heavy blow to the prestige for the Ukrainian movement. Your main concern was, however, to establish a perfect understanding with the UHVR that BANDERA, once captured, would inevitably be handed over to the Soviets by the U.S. authorities. It would then be too late to intervene and
5) In case STETSKO should come forward with information containing a lead to BANDERA's hiding place, we shall try to inform you on time. If we have reason to believe that coverage of that lead is likely to result in BANDERA's capture, we shall have to lay out our course of action in the light of our conflicting interests in the matter. Tipping off BANDERA, if this should be decided upon, would have to be done with utmost discretion obviating the remotest possibility that his escape is traced back to a U.S. agency. In anticipation of such contingency, you should now cast about for secure means of passing such information, taking into account, of course, that should any intimation of our connivance in BANDERA's escape reach the ears of the UHVR, we could expect with certainty that the Soviets would learn about it sooner or later. This dilemma could best be avoided, we believe, if the tip-off be launched into UHVR channels through an elaborate chain of notional and/or actual cutouts.
Distribution: 1 - AB-43, Munich (Attach) 1 - USFET Det.
1 - SC, Washington (Attach) 1 - Registry
1 - SC, [ ] 1 - Ops
1 - SC, [ ]
20 November 1946
TO: SC Washington
FROM: SC Amzon
SUBJEXT: Search for BANDERA, Leader of the OUN
REF: LTX-767, Wash 4345
1) The risk of compromise in attempting to help BANDERA either directly or indirectly has been kept down to the absolute minimum. G-2 USFET is definitely loath to comply with the Soviet request to find BANDERA and to repatriate him as a "war criminal". This, we have been given to understand unofficially of course, and we can be reasonably sure that a warning passed to a UHVR representative will not be considered as an act of bad faith on our part if, by a remote chance, G-2 USFET should learn about it.
2) As far as compromising ourselves vis a vis the Soviets is concerned, we have taken pains not to let this warning appear in the light of an official "tip-off", but rather in the nature of a general observation. Once BANDERA has been apprehended we would decline to be in any way connected with the case, a point we stressed in LTS 767. In this connection we should like to mention as an interesting side-light that Lt Col Dasher recently expressed to AB 52 his disappointment that G-2 USFET has failed to honor its pledge to Colonel ANTONIUK to make every conceivable effort to locate BANDERA.
3) Your question whether there are compelling reasons for us to help BANDERA directly or indirectly, can be answered in the affirmative if you accept the premise that we are definitely interested in cautiously cultivating our contacts with the UHVR if not along lines of active cooperation, then with at least the objective to keep ourselves informed on what its plans are and to what extent it has succeeded in building up and servicing cells in the Ukraine. We asked KILKENNY how our relationship with the UHVR, at present and in the future, would be affected if the Americans were to lend a hand in the capture and repatriation of BANDERA to the Soviets. He said he could answer this question in one word: FINITO. In order to enable you to appraise the importance of BANDERA in the hierarchy of Ukrainian Underground leaders - and we are thinking here of the Ukrainian movement as a whole
DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2004 2006
irrespective of its many factions who differ in methods rather than in the main objective - we have requested KILKENNY to prepare a study which you will find attached herewith.
4) In attempting to visualize the effects of the loss of BANDERA through American connivance, there is one more consideration which should be brought to your attention. The UHVR is avowedly a terrorist organization, determined to accomplish its objectives by terroristic means. (That appears to be one of the main reasons for the pre-occupation of the Soviet-Intelligence with Ukrainian rather than other dissident groups like e.g., the Caucasians.) It should therefore not be ruled out that the UHVR would want to retaliate by terroristic means and that its suspicions would fasten on the American representatives with whom they have been exclusively dealing.
Distribution:
2 - Wash
1 - AB 45
1 - [ ]
1 - [ ]
1 - AB 39
1 - Aust
1 - [ ]
1 - Ops
1 - Registry